Cisco 300-740 Designing and Implementing Secure Cloud Access for Users and Endpoints (SCAZT) Exam Practice Test

The Secure Cloud Analytics alert log shows multiple SSH connections on port 22 from diverse and geographically distributed IP addresses targeting a single GCP instance (www-gcp-east-4c). According to the Cloud Analytics alert logic described in SCAZT (Section 6: Threat Response, Pages 113–116), this behavior indicates “Geographically Unusual Remote Access.” It typically triggers when a host receives connections from countries not normally associated with the network’s usage profile. This is often linked to reconnaissance or brute-force SSH attempts.

Based on the alert of “Geographically Unusual Remote Access” from Secure Cloud Analytics and the SSH logs from foreign IPs, this device (linux-gcp-east-4c) has likely been compromised. According to SCAZT Section 6: Threat Response (Pages 114–117):

B: Isolating/quarantining the host is an immediate incident response step to prevent lateral movement and data exfiltration.

E: A firewall rule blocking inbound SSH to the GCP VM from external sources would be the appropriate access control response to prevent recurrence.

Options A and C (reinstallation) may be used later during recovery but are not immediate containment steps. Blocking outgoing SSH (Option D) is less relevant than restricting inbound SSH in this scenario.

Directory traversal attacks exploit improper file path validations to access unauthorized directories and files. To prevent this, it is critical to restrict what areas of the file system an application or user can access. Limiting file system permissions prevents attackers from gaining access to sensitive areas even if a traversal vulnerability exists.

As explained in SCAZT Section 4 (Application and Data Security, Pages 85–87), enforcing minimal privileges and file system segmentation is a key defense against such attacks.

The screenshot from Cisco ISE shows a configuration of a “File Condition” posture check that verifies the existence and version of the “Srv.sys” file in the System32 directory. This is a known method to validate if a Windows device has received a critical security patch (in this case, one related to protection against the WannaCry vulnerability, MS17-010). Cisco ISE does not rely solely on a patch management system for this type of validation but can use specific file version and path checks. Therefore, the correct posture condition is File Condition.

In the provided screenshot of Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC), the rule labeled "Block Facebook" is intended to block access to Facebook and Facebook Apps. However, the rule lacks correct zone configurations, which is why the block is ineffective.

Per Cisco's best practices outlined in the Designing and Implementing Secure Cloud Access for Users and Endpoints (SCAZT) documentation and Cisco Secure Firewall documentation:

The source zone should reflect where the traffic is originating from—in this case, from internal users. Therefore, Source Zone must be set to inside (Answer: E).

The destination zone should reflect where the traffic is headed—in this case, towards the internet. So, Destination Zone must be set to outside (Answer: D).

Without properly defining source and destination zones, FMC rules may not match the traffic correctly, resulting in traffic being incorrectly allowed.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a globally recognized knowledge base that catalogs adversary behavior. One of its most crucial components is its matrix of Tactics and Techniques.

“Techniques for accessing credentials” is a key example of the Techniques layer within the MITRE ATT&CK matrix.

These techniques describe how adversaries achieve tactical objectives—such as gaining access to credentials for lateral movement or privilege escalation.

In the SCAZT guide under Threat Response, organizations are advised to map telemetry and detection tools (like Cisco Secure Analytics, SecureX, and Secure Endpoint) to the MITRE ATT&CK framework to enhance visibility and accelerate threat response.

Cisco XDR (Extended Detection and Response) leverages artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) to prioritize actions based on the severity, context, and impact of detected threats. According to the Designing and Implementing Secure Cloud Access for Users and Endpoints (SCAZT) documentation, Cisco XDR consolidates telemetry from endpoints, networks, cloud, email, and identity sources and applies AI/ML models to reduce alert fatigue, correlate signals, and surface only the highest-risk threats for response.

This intelligent correlation and prioritization mechanism enables security analysts to focus on critical incidents first, dramatically reducing mean time to detect (MTTD) and mean time to respond (MTTR). Unlike static mechanisms such as antivirus updates or passive traffic inspection, AI-driven analytics enable Cisco XDR to make data-informed decisions across the entire attack surface.

In IKEv1 policy configuration for Cisco ASA, two key commands are required to define the encryption and hashing algorithms:

A: encryption aes-256 defines the encryption method for the IKE SA.

E: hash sha-256 ensures SHA-256 is used as the integrity mechanism during IKE phase 1.

According to Cisco documentation and SCAZT (Section 1: Cloud Security Architecture, Pages 19–22), these two components are essential to negotiating a secure VPN tunnel. The provided config uses group 1 (modp768), which is weak by today’s standards and could also lead to negotiation failure. However, from the available options, encryption and hash are the two required for tunnel success.

The Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) uses TCP port 3389. Cisco Umbrella includes a cloud-delivered firewall that can be used to block outbound traffic by port. In this case, since the RDP communication needs to be prevented regardless of application name resolution, the best approach is to use a Firewall policy in Umbrella to block port 3389 traffic across the tunnel.

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The Cisco SAFE architecture uses the concept of Secure Domains as foundational blocks. These domains represent areas of the network (e.g., Branch, Data Center, Cloud, Edge) that require specific security controls. Each domain aligns with controls across visibility, segmentation, threat protection, and identity services.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) includes an “Inbox” tab where detected threats and flagged endpoints are listed. When Duo Trusted Endpoints integration is in place, an endpoint may be denied access if it fails posture checks. The correct workflow includes reviewing the machine’s status in Cisco Secure Endpoint and marking the incident as “Resolved” in the Inbox tab to restore authentication.

This process is described in SCAZT Section 2 (User and Device Security, Pages 44–46) for enforcing endpoint trust with Secure Endpoint and Duo Trusted Endpoints integration.

The anyconnect keep-installer none command is used to remove the Cisco Secure Client (formerly AnyConnect) from an endpoint once the VPN session ends. This is useful in temporary or kiosk-based access environments. The default behavior retains the client.

This capability is covered in SCAZT Section 2: User and Device Security (Pages 40–44), which outlines VPN session lifecycle management and Secure Client policies.

The provided JSON-like policy structure shows a segmentation rule with action "BLOCK" and filters referencing the HTTPS Consumer and HTTPS Provider. However, to block HTTP, you must define the protocol explicitly in the parameters. The attribute “l4_params” is currently empty. According to Cisco Secure Workload best practices (SCAZT Section 4: Application and Data Security, Pages 88–91), Layer 4 parameters (l4_params) must be used to specify protocols such as HTTP or port 80. Without defining HTTP here, the policy does not apply to HTTP traffic.

To integrate Cisco Webex with Duo SSO using the Duo Access Gateway, the engineer must:

E: Add Cisco Webex as a new SAML application to Duo.

C: Configure the Webex application settings, including Entity ID, Assertion Consumer Service URL, and signing requirements.

Uploading XML metadata (Option A) is typically used when importing IdP settings, not for Duo application configuration. JSON (Option B) is not used in SAML-based Duo app configurations.

Cisco Talos is Cisco’s threat intelligence organization, delivering real-time threat intelligence and malware analytics to help organizations detect and prevent threats before they impact the network. According to the SCAZT guide, Talos provides comprehensive coverage of threat data including signatures, indicators of compromise, and context-driven analytics. This intelligence feeds into Cisco security platforms such as Cisco SecureX and Cisco Secure Endpoint to enhance detection, investigation, and response capabilities. Talos is explicitly referenced in the Threat Response section as the primary source of threat intelligence and malware analytics that supports cloud and endpoint security frameworks.

The Zero Trust model relies on the principle of "never trust, always verify" and includes continuous verification based on real-time data. According to SCAZT Section 1 (Cloud Security Architecture, Pages 14–17), user and device behavior are key elements for continuous verification. Behavioral analytics evaluates deviations from typical activity, such as time of login, geolocation, access frequency, and resource usage to adapt trust levels dynamically. This is central to adaptive access control and risk-based authentication.

When integrating Cisco ISE with Azure AD using SAML SSO:

B: The Azure AD metadata must be uploaded into ISE to establish trust and allow token validation.

D: External Identity Sources settings must be configured in ISE to recognize and process authentication requests via SAML-based identity providers like Azure AD.

These are mandatory steps for enabling browser-based SSO authentication in ISE as explained in SCAZT Section 2 (User and Device Security, Pages 42–44), which describes federated identity integration.

Note: Option A is already completed as stated in the prompt. Options C and E are not essential to the authentication flow in this SAML context.